Recently, in accordance with
all laws of the advertising campaign, there appeared one-type materials in many
mass media that are devoted to the heroic role of the Ukrainian military
intelligence officers in the «orange » revolution. We would like to remind that
the first try to obtain all the rights in bringing the revolution to a peaceful
end was made by Smeshko and his «troop»
at the end of the past year in foreign mass media. That opus was titled like
«how the Ukrainian spies saved» something. The present opuses are of the same
kind. They tell how the nurselings
and team-mates of Igor Petrovich
stopped, by means of long lasting phone talks, «hordes» of the general Popkov,
that were already arriving to Kyiv with hats full of ball rounds. All
these «phone» revolutionaries look
like quite heroic ones. Especially if one takes into consideration that the
number of people on Maidan and the
spirits of the whole Ukrainian capital prompted a peaceful outcome anyway. Nevertheless, we are not Uzbekistan and there are not only
idiots even in internal troops. But, let them be, heroes. Glory to the heroes!
Especially to those who can put the eggs into the baskets in time. Now, to me personally, is more
interesting what are the reasons for the latest advertising campaign of
«Smeshko family»? On the one hand, it means that the suspicions in poisoning of
Yushchenko were cleared from Igor Petrovich, and he can expect a new
nomination. And he unobtrusively reminds to the guarantor about himself. Viktor
Andreyevich now believes that he was poisoned by his former «pals» —
Chervonenko and company. Interesting, why does he think so? As a result of
somebody’s criminal investigation or it’s the latest «case»?
Though let’s come back to Smeshko. The
mental PR of his campaign may mean
that Igor Petrovich intends to
take part in elections within some election list and have a rest in the shadow
of parliamentary privilege. Not
bad as well. Especially for the country.
But it seems to us more vivid that he thinks about his nomination in Foreign Intelligence
Service or his business in traffic in arms. The motivation of such intentions
is quite commercial. With a skilful use of both positions
one may earn a good sum of money. And influence the politics. Hark! Medvedchuk’s
steps are heard. Insinuating but close. Really, a stupid thing to think that
Medvedchuk may rest quietly in opposition and won’t try to plant a mole into
the present governance. And employing the weakness of today’s governance that’s
easy to do. And he does it.
There arises the question, why the author does not
like the institution called (GUR MO – General Board of Intelligence of the Ministry of
Defence) and Smeshko in particular , to that extent? The author has all the
grounds to tell that there are two tragic moments in the history of this
organization. The obtaining
of the right by «island» to conduct criminal investigation and Smeshko’s activity being the head of this organization and SBU (National Security Service).
«Reichswehr should not operate inside
the Reich» — quite an old axiom. Abroad – you’re welcome. Inside –it’s a
crime. We have this crime legalized. Smeshko’s activity in GUR MO, as we
already wrote about it, was nothing but a commercial use of agency and
«wiretaps and external
observation», traffic in arms and
political intriguery. The next
tragedy was the nomination of Smeshko to the head of SBU. In any political
situation SBU remains one of the most important state institution. The exclusion of foreign spies, for example,
is an equal attribute of statehood to such as state emblem and flag. Igor
Petrovich with his «troop» just decided to destroy that attribute. Separation of SVR (Foreign Intelligence
Service), commercialization of the
criminal investigation, the payment for the nominations – all together it crippled the SBU. The return of these «funny guys» from the
«island» to the power means the next «privatization» of some state institution. At this time, it may be SVR. No
one would like that in the course of pre-election fights, the competitive parts
would forget that not all the allies, so as yoghurts, are equally useful. And
that in the thick of fight for the votes, one can just blow off the state.
If there isn’t, of course, the aim to destroy the state.
Stanislav Rechinskiy «ORD»
Appendix
Alexander Galaka, the chief of the General Board
of Intelligence of the Ministry of
Defence tells about the people that were in his office in the evening of
November 28, 2004, and what they did and how they managed the process.
Нe tells, in details, what was going
on in his office on the «island» (that’s how they call the place of location of GUR on Rybalskiy island,
Dnieper River, Kiev) on November 28, 2004. The very date that could become a
«bloody Sunday».
«…It came to my knowledge, that in the morning of
November 28, there was some
meeting in the Ministry of Defence, and as if there was discussed a question
about imposing a state of emergency (Alexander Kuzmuk, ex-minister of Defence
rejected the statement and said that he would lead the Army to the President
elected by people). I phoned to
the Chief of Defence, Kirichenko. I could not order him, but …I said, there is
an information, so will you look
through the law carefully, because some people will just enplane and fly away,
and we’ll stay…(the charter, civil, was already prepared in Hostomel )
Kirichenko evaded the question and said : «God bless
you and help you». Immediately after that I learned about the meeting of
security officials in Konche-Zaspa, with Kuchma’s participation in it. I was
not invited.
My deputy, Nikolay Ivanovich Melnik said that I needed
to meet with the Commander-in-Chief of
Land Forces. Having learned all the details of the current situation,
the Commander-in-Chief said that the forces should not be used in this case. So
I knew that there was a force to protect the people.
In the afternoon, I was informed that Yulia Timoshenko
wanted to have a meeting with me. I phoned also Igor Drizhchany (deputy of the
Chief of SBU), Vitaliy Romanchenko (chief of the department of the military
intelligence) and Sergey Nichiporenko (chief of the VB SBU) to ask them to be
present at that meeting as well. Yulia Timoshenko, after Maidan, came to us
with the deputy of Verkhovnaya Rada, Ivchenko.
While talking, at about 22:45, there appeared an
information that Popkov ordered to give the ammunition….This order was
confirmed by many sources.
Everybody began to clarify the situation through all possible channels.
I phoned Kirichenko again and said that they give the
ammunition. The answer was : «So what?»
Everybody was busy: phoned, talked but did not
coordinated the deeds of each other. The danger increased. Popkov came over
immediately the forth stage of the military combat readiness, missing the three
previous ones. As the officers then told, the ammunition was put just into the hats.
After half an hour Popkov gave the order to retreat.
There was one interesting fact about our meeting with
Yulia Timoshenko. The external
observation followed her, and left her only near the «island».
At 9
o’clock in the morning I had to report in the Ministry of Defence. I had the
meeting, made a report and left. Only a little bit later, they were all looking
for me. So I had the second meeting with Kuzmuk. He asked whom, from the
deputies, I met with, yesterday. I said that Timoshenko was. Then there came an
interrogation: why didn’t I informed him about that. I answered that everybody
had the right to have a rest anywhere one would prefer. He tried to make me
write a report. I refused and left the cabinet…At that very day the Minister
demanded two my deputies to the Ministry: Melnik and Lysenko.
The Minister proposed them to head the General Board
of Intelligence. Everybody refused. But to fire a government official is not as
easy as it may seem, one have to define what is the reason. Though, already on
November 29, I was followed by external observation. It continued for a month.
From that moment I used the guard services.
There is one thing that makes me feel sad. The next
day, on the 29th, while the meeting in Maidan, Poroshenko said, that thanks to
officers and generals of the Army forces, we could escape an inevitable thing
and I did not take the floor and didn’t tell about the real things happened.
They proposed me to do that but I did not. Unfortunately. Because in that way I
could diminish any possible information campaign against me. I could protect
not only myself but many others as well. The governance had been changed,
without blood, and the people that were present in my office on November 28,
2004 made a great contribution in
that business.
